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Abstract 
Compulsory community treatment for people with severe mental illness remains 
controversial due to conflicting research evidence. Recently, there have been challenges to 
the conventional view that trials-based evidence should take precedence. This paper adds to 
these challenges in three ways. First, it emphasises the need for critiques of trials to engage 
with conceptual and not just technical issues. Second, it develops a critique of trials centred 
on both how we can have knowledge and what it is we can have knowledge of. Third, it uses 
this critique to develop a research strategy that capitalises on the information in large-scale 
datasets.    
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Introduction 
Although widely adopted around the world, compulsory community treatment (CCT) for 
people with severe mental illness remains highly controversial.1 Stemming from intrinsic 
concerns about its coercive basis, the controversy has been heightened considerably by 
conflicting evidence about CCT’s effectiveness.  
 
Of key significance has been a division between findings from research based on 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs) with those based on a variety of non-experimental 
designs. While the latter have shown both positive (e.g. increased follow-up with mental 
health services and improved forensic outcomes) and negative outcomes (e.g. no reduction 
in hospitalisation), the results of the former have overwhelmingly been negative.  
 
Following conventional biomedical thinking, the findings from trials have tended to have 
been given priority. Recently, however, some workers have challenged this position, arguing 
that while RCTs have advantages for discrete, single component clinical interventions, they 
may not be intrinsically superior for the evaluation of complex multi-component 
interventions such as CCT.2,3 
 
This paper aims to contribute to this challenge in three ways. First, it draws out, and 
emphasises the need, for critiques of randomised trials of CCT to move beyond technical 
problems and consider conceptual/theoretical issues. Second, it draws on realist notions of 
open and closed systems to develop a conceptual critique of trials that considers both how 
we can have knowledge (epistemology) and what it is we can have knowledge of (ontology). 
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Third, it outlines the key implications of this critique before using them to develop a novel 
and innovative research methodology capable of capitalising, but not relying, on the wealth 
of information in increasingly available large-scale datasets.  
 
Randomised trials: the technical critique 
There is now a large body of evidence on the effectiveness of CCT including a number of 
reviews.4-6 While the vast majority of this evidence has been non-experimental in design, 
three randomised trials have been conducted: the first two in America; the third, and most 
recent, in England.7-9  
 
Although much fewer in number, adherence to the traditional hierarchy of evidence has 
meant the findings and conclusions of the three randomised trials have often been given 
much greater credence. As would be expected, attachment to this way of thinking has 
permeated a Cochrane review process (and associated meta-analyses) with only a tiny 
fraction of observational studies being included.10-12 It has, however, also been prominent in 
less structured reviews where ‘further RCTs’ have been seen as the way of providing 
definitive evidence.6 Although a similar more recent review avoids such a conclusion, it still 
placed greater emphasis on the problems associated with non-experimental studies.13   
 
Despite their higher standing, several workers have drawn attention to weaknesses with the 
randomised trials of CCT. Given the well-recognised ethical problems associated with 
randomising patients with severe mental health problems to experimental intervention and 
control groups, this is, perhaps, not surprising. Indeed, it is evident in the history of the trials 
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themselves. The early American trials were widely recognised as having a number of 
difficulties including the exclusion of patients with a history of violence, high attrition rates, 
small sample sizes and protocol violations. In light of this, the later English trial was seen as 
an opportunity to put things right and provide ‘the missing link – a convincing RCT’.14  
 
Since publication, however, a number of commentators have also drawn attention to 
problems with this later trial. For Kisely, the concerns raised crystallise around two main 
issues – potential bias, especially selection bias, and the nature of the control group.15 
Factors contributing to the first include: the exclusion of patients not capable of giving 
consent, the inability to include patients viewed by clinicians as clear candidates for CCT, the 
decision by patients not to participate, and the switching of patients between arms of the 
study after randomisation. In terms of the second, legal and ethical approval could only be 
obtained for the comparison of people on CCT with those on section 17 leave which is, itself, 
a form of CCT.  As a result, it has been argued that the trial did not in fact compare CCT 
against no CCT, thus narrowing the chances of finding significant differences on the selected 
outcomes.16  
 
There is, therefore, a well-established and clearly de-lineated technical critique of 
randomised trials within the CCT literature. Significantly, as already noted, these problems, 
although widely recognised, are often not sufficient (or, at least, not perceived as being a 
more significant than those associated with other research designs) to unsettle a belief in 
the relevance of the hierarchy of evidence for research on CCT.  
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Randomised trials – a conceptual critique 
The difficulty with trials in CCT research is not, however, simply technical: it consists of more 
than practical or ethical problems. Put slightly differently, while technical fixes (i.e. better 
designed trials) might be useful, they would not eliminate all of the difficulty. Rather, there 
is a more fundamental problem due to the conceptual bases and assumptions (the ‘world 
view’) on which trials are based. Put most simply, there is a mismatch between the object of 
study and the methods of study. While one way in which this manifests itself is through 
technical difficulties, there is also a more significant conceptual non-alignment. One fruitful 
way to think of this is through the notion of closed and open systems as developed within 
realist philosophies of science.17  
 
Closed systems are those in which objects with causal powers do not change in themselves 
(the intrinsic condition of closure), nor vary according to the external conditions in which 
they occur (the extrinsic condition of closure). When there is closure, it is reasonable to 
expect causal mechanisms to manifest themselves as regularities. While closed systems can 
occur naturally, they can also be created by intervention. In fact, this is the aim and purpose 
of randomised trials. Thus, by isolating a mechanism (the intervention), and triggering its 
outcome in a stable context (equivalent treatment and control groups), regularities in trials 
(succession of events) come to stand as causality.  
 
Open systems, meanwhile, are those in which either, or both, of the conditions of closure 
are not met. As the social world in which CCT occurs is undoubtedly open – the actors 
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involved are capable of reflection and change, they are affected by the contextual settings 
in which they act and, indeed, the system of CCT itself can change and alter – it is 
unreasonable to expect regularities and causality must be found in deeper levels of 
explanation.  
 
One useful approach arising from the challenge of open and closed systems - realist 
evaluation (RE) – has been recognised in recent work on CCT.3 RE emphasises that 
interventions in and of themselves do not ‘work’, rather they are shaped by social actors - it 
is the people involved in them, and the circumstances in which those people find 
themselves, that determine an intervention’s capacity to work (or not).18 Thus, while the 
content of interventions may act as generative causal mechanisms, these mechanisms can 
be activated (‘fired’) or lie dormant, depending on the salience of different components to 
those applying interventions, and the context in which the social actors involved are 
situated. This thinking is summarised in RE’s key formula: 
  
Context (C) + Mechanism (M) = Outcome (O) 
 
As O’Reilly and Vingilis argue, therefore, a key part of the difficulty with trials for research 
on CCT is epistemological: different approaches are needed to get knowledge of the world.  
 
Notions of closed and open systems as outlined here, however, remind us that there is a 
further challenge that is more ontological in nature - what is the (social) world like that we 
want to have knowledge of? Implicit within the positivist-inspired thinking that shapes RCTs 
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is a view of the world as stable, regular and typified by universal rules or laws. In contrast, 
realist notions of open and closed systems suggest a world which, although not random, is 
characterised by patterned variations.19 Crucially, such patterns, or ‘demi-regularities’ as 
they have been called,20 can provide an ideal starting point for uncovering the mechanisms 
generating them. Identifying and examining ‘demi-regs’ offers, therefore, an important, but 
so far neglected, way for realist-inspired research on CCT to get a handle on causal 
mechanisms.21 In this way, they can help secure a switch from the focus on overall ‘average’ 
effects advanced by trials-dominated approaches to the alternative RE goal of investigating 
and taking seriously diverse, contingent, situated outcomes or, as it’s often summarised, 
establishing what works, for whom, under what circumstances and why.  
 
Realist principles for the evaluation of CCT 
Before outlining one way that the analysis of demi-regs may proceed and how it can 
connect with the approach outlined by O’Reilly and Vingilis, it is worth briefly drawing out 
the general lessons from RE and its philosophical antecedents so as to construct some 
general principles for future empirical research on CCT. Again, these principles aim to move 
research on CCT beyond technically dominated discussions of RCTs.  
 
First, it comes as no surprise from a realist-inspired perspective that the research findings 
on CCT have been mixed. Indeed, one worker describes this as the ‘iron law of evaluation’: 
‘the expected value of any net impact assessment of any large-scales social program is 
zero’.22 When interventions are seen as centring on people behaving in an open-system 
social world, and when the contexts comprising that social world are taken seriously, then 
the workings of mechanisms, and the outcomes arising from them, will only ever be 
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contingent, multiple and varied. CCT will not work for all people, in all places, at all times - 
no human, social-based intervention does. Outcome variation is to be expected and the 
findings from research will be inconsistent. From a realist perspective, the job is to find out 
for which types of patients, in which types of circumstances CCT works best, not whether it 
works ‘as a whole’. Research needs to be able to anticipate, handle and explore the 
variation – the demi-regs - that this implies. 
 
Second, the complexity of the open-system social world means no single research method 
has privileged access to it. Accordingly, realist-inspired evaluation does not champion or 
disparage any particular research design but argues for a plurality of methods and sensitivity 
to sources of variation and causation. It is important to note that that this may include RCTs, 
but it would not be restricted to them, nor privilege them. Extensive quantitative research 
capable of detecting the variation and heterogeneity that RCTs struggle to capture would be 
an essential counterpart. Equally valuable, however, is intensive qualitative research, 
particularly when it moves beyond simply recording the views and experiences of 
participants to uncover the capacities of human agents to respond to the resources 
embodied in mechanisms.23  
 
Lastly, accepting the need for a plurality of methods necessitates a more pragmatic attitude 
to evidence. If there are no ‘crucial experiments’, or the only ones possible are far removed 
from the ideal type necessary for the advantages of experimental design to apply, then the 
application of traditional evidence hierarchies is no longer appropriate. Furthermore, 
treating interventions as the product of situated human action and interaction means a 
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‘formula and rulebook’ approach is not as important as one that follows processes of 
implementation and ‘learns as it goes’.  
 
Beyond randomised trials: another way forward for research on CCT 
As already noted, when the critique of trials is restricted to the technical, the necessary 
solution is better-designed trials. Triallists have, of course, made considerable advances in 
this area, developing a number of extensions to the basic parallel group design such as 
stepped wedge and patient preference designs. Indeed, the UK Medical Research Council 
have argued these types of trials are more appropriate for evaluating complex interventions 
such as CCT.24 Proponents of realist-inspired thinking are, of course, more sceptical. From 
their perspective, and as argued here, experimental designs have intrinsic ‘blind spots’, 
rather than just technical problems to which a fix or extension can be applied. As one of the 
originators of RE has succinctly put it, “one cannot design out complexity”.25  
 
O’Reilly and Vingilis outline a typical RE approach to working with this complexity (as well as 
a Theory of Change approach) consisting of four stages: (i) talking to program implementers; 
(ii) drawing up mini-theories based on the formula outlined above; (iii) assessing the mini-
theories in light of outcomes, (iv) developing and refining the mini-theories. In this final 
section, we add to their work in light of our conceptual critique and the principles we have 
drawn from it. In brief, we respond to the specific need for a research strategy capable of 
detecting and unravelling multiple outcomes in a heterogeneous, open system social world. 
 
To start, we would like to emphasise the importance of recognising different ways of 
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thinking of context. For O’Reilly and Vingilis, context is seen in terms of social 
processes/structures: in their illustrative example, for example, the context is homelessness. 
As Sayer’s seminal work emphasised, however, social processes/structures always have 
geographies (and histories for that matter).19 Not only do these geographies provide a 
setting or back-drop, but they also make a difference to the social processes/structures 
themselves. Homelessness is not singular or uniform, instead it is multiple and complex. 
Homelessness in one place will not be the same as homelessness in another. Thus, the 
actual workings and effects of mechanisms will depend on the specific geographical settings 
in which they operate. Although not without problems of its own, by treating context in 
more explicitly geographical terms, (i.e. as spatially-based locales, for example, areas of 
residence or specific health service provider settings), we have a way of producing bounded 
ecological systems that can help provide a way-in to the operation of causal mechanisms in 
empirical research. In short, interventions come together in particular places in specific 
arrangements with specific effects.  
 
When context is seen in terms of geographical-based entities, it becomes possible to outline 
a research strategy in tune with open social systems that combines the strengths of both 
extensive and intensive research methods. Importantly, this strategy is also able to exploit 
the richness of increasingly available large-scale administrative routine datasets without 
being entirely dependent on them. The strategy consists of three phases. 
 
In the first phase, extensive quantitative research based on large-scale datasets could be 
used to identify ‘outliers’ – contexts where CCT outcomes are unusual, either particularly 
good or particularly poor. Returning to the conceptual ideas covered earlier, this phase is 
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concerned with getting to grips with the demi-regularities of open social systems. The 
profile of outcomes could, of course, be different for different types of people such that 
there is an interaction between patients and the contexts, or levels, through which, and at 
which, CCT operates.  
 
Multilevel modelling approaches provide one particularly effective way of identifying 
anomalous settings. Traditional forms of statistical analysis focus on finding an average 
effect based on a large number of patients in one, or few, settings and assume it can be 
generalised elsewhere. Multilevel modelling approaches, in contrast, focus on the variation 
in the average effect that exists across a large number of settings and assume it applies 
nowhere.26 Such approaches provide, therefore, a way of seeing both the general and the 
specific – estimates of the relationship between variables across all places, and estimates of 
the extent to which places differ from this relationship. By explicitly recognising the way in 
which patients nest within a variety of real-world contexts, some of which may potentially 
overlap, the method allows a series of technical benefits to be harnessed – standard errors 
can be adjusted for autocorrelation and estimates of the differences between contexts can 
be precision-weighted. In this way, extensive research can be both geographically more 
realistic and statistically more accurate.  
 
As anticipated almost two decades ago now, the setting is the real unit of analysis in this 
type of work and research designs need to be powered according to the number of these, 
not the number of patients.27 Given this, being able to use large-scale, representative 
administrative datasets is an intrinsic feature of this approach and a considerable strength. 
As others have noted, RCT-based approaches usually attempt to factor out the effect of 
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context by randomising or controlling the settings that are included.28 Here, in contrast, the 
full range of real-world settings captured in the data is worked with purposefully and 
willingly so that any variation that exists can be brought to light.   
 
The unusual contexts, or ‘contrastive demi-regularities’, identified in the first phase become 
the focus for the second phase of research: intensive qualitative research in the places 
where outcomes are most different. As has been noted by others, adopting a ‘most 
different’ comparative approach maximises the scope for theory development.29 Thus, we 
have a way of targeting the places where it is most likely that more conventional RE 
methods could be used most productively.  
 
It is important to emphasise that this second phase of work must move beyond simply 
recording the perceptions and views of those involved in CCT to concentrating on how 
causal mechanisms are constituted and operate in different places. In broad terms, CCT 
seeks to bring about behavioural control through mandatory programmes. Often, though, 
these programmes are reduced simply to ‘coercion’. Patients will, however, respond to 
coercion in different ways depending on their capacities, as will the clinicians responsible for 
determining and enforcing it. This last point is key, for while it is often said that CCT binds 
patients to clinicians, it also binds clinicians to patients. Intensive research is, therefore, 
necessary to open the ‘black box’ constituting the actual mechanisms underlying CCT. 
Whether CCT will be effective will depend on: the workloads of clinicians, the background of 
patients, levels of familial support, access to community mental-health services, the range 
of additional support services, the availability of suitable accommodation.  The role and 
balance of these factors will, of course, depend on the specific, local geographical context in 
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which they exist. Useful work in this vein has started to be produced and has begun to 
illuminate the intricacies involved in the human-based social intervention that is CCT.23  It is 
interesting to note, however, that only two settings were studied in this work, with no 
attempt seeming to be made to utilise a ‘most different’ comparative design so as to 
maximise theory development. 
 
The final phase of research would, using Pawson’s words, be to ‘scavenge’ amongst the 
range of evidence developed through this plurality of methods and subject it to ‘organised 
scepticism’.25 This would involve a collegiate group of stakeholders coming together to 
assess carefully whether the evidence supports the inferences drawn from it. Crucially, all 
those engaged in this would have to put aside any tribal loyalties they might have, including 
the rigid adherence to traditional hierarchies of evidence.  Significantly, it will produce 
results and outputs very different from those produced by trials: rather than average 
treatment effects (or sub-group components, thereof), it will consist of rich, complex 
pictures more like narratives or field descriptions.30   
 
It is in this final phase that we would see again the value of seeing context through a more 
geographically-based lens. As others have emphasised, evidence-based policy is not simply 
about finding out if an intervention works somewhere.31 It is also about finding out if it will 
work here: a new location where the intervention hasn’t been tried or a location where it is 
clear that it is not working but could be made to do so if suitable modifications were made. 
For interventions to travel successfully it is necessary to know how they work and the 
factors needed to support their working. Since interventions are always implemented in a 
specific place, here, not just somewhere, viewing context in terms of geographical-based 
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locations offers an important way of helping ensure research moves from ‘it worked 
somewhere’ to the more useful conclusion of, ‘it will work here’. Applicability and 
transferability to and from particular settings is more relevant than notions of simple 
generalisibility and these are likely to be fostered to a greater extent when context is 
treated in a more explicitly geographically based fashion.32 
 
Discussion  
The technical limitations of randomised trials for research on CCT are well-recognised. 
Indeed, some workers have suggested that the difficulties of conducting trials mean it is 
unlikely that many others will be attempted.15 This has not, nevertheless, diminished their 
standing or a sense that other methods are, in comparison, an inferior fall-back option. This 
paper emphasises that the problem with trials is, however, never simply technical. It is, 
instead, always conceptual. The importance of this distinction is considerable, not least 
because of the tendency for trials to be seen as a way of delivering atheoretical, 
assumption-free impact evaluation.33  
 
In contrast to other recent work, this paper articulates arguments as much on the basis of 
what we can expect the social world to be like as how we can have knowledge of it. In this 
way, it develops and extends these attempts to move research on CCT beyond trials. The 
research strategy outlined offers a means of integrating different methodological 
approaches to mental health services research in the manner imagined by Slade and Priebe: 
quantitative analysis centred on finding differences in outcomes dovetailing with qualitative, 
ethnographic research targeted at the differences found. The former finding where and for 
whom things are different; the latter establishing how and why things are different. 
16 
 
Importantly, this approach is able to capitalise on the ever-increasing investment in ‘big 
data’ without being over-exposed to its limitations or losing sight of the need to 
complement its version of the truth with that obtained from other methods.34  
 
The approach outlined here is, of course, not without its own difficulties. Operationalising 
context in geographical based terms (either in terms of residential areas or in terms of 
service providers) will, itself, be partial in some way. Geographical/institutional boundaries 
are never fixed, impermeable or all-embracing. As is well-known, study results can be prone 
to the modifiable area unit problem.35 While multilevel models help provide a way of 
reflecting the layered-nature of social reality, notions of nested hierarchies can imply that 
causal processes run downwards and that mechanisms associated with one level can be 
neatly separated from those at other levels.36 It is, therefore, in part for these reasons that 
the use of such models is seen only as a first step in the approach outlined here. Imperfect 
though they are, we believe such models can still provide a valuable starting point for 
empirical research on complex interventions in complex open systems.  
 
Using administrative data also brings with it its own challenges. Although increasingly 
available, they are still not present across many parts of health systems. Perhaps of more 
significance, however, is the fact that when data is routinely collected it is often of low 
quality such that it can be characterised as FUPS: Flawed, Uncertain, Proximate and 
Sparse.37 As the workers who have coined this acronym show, however, such data can still 
be used to instigate useful, important conversations in the ‘swampy lowlands’ of everyday 
health care practice. It is, therefore, very much in this spirit that we conceive of its use here: 
as opening up a way of directing focused intensive qualitative-based research. In contrast to 
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the data from RCTs, the fact that it is continuously collected, long-lasting, large-scale and 
grounded in real world settings emphasise a need to find ways of using it. Making use of it in 
the way suggested here – as a first-step guide – means the dangers of non-use can be 
avoided while the dangers of over-interpretation are minimised.    
 
As we have noted, other work has sought to move research on CCT beyond RCTs. While this 
work has usefully emphasised the significance of CCT being a complex intervention, it has 
not so clearly drawn out (or on) the significance of the systems in which such interventions 
occur as being complex.38 We have drawn on realist perspectives of science to make this 
point. It should be noted, however, that there are other ways of approaching this. 
Complexity theory is one alternative which is receiving much attention at the moment, 
though it has a longer pedigree, even within health research.39 While there are important 
differences between realist and complexity-based thinking, leading to proponents of the 
former having serious reservations about the latter,25 it is likely that there will be increasing, 
productive engagement between them.40 If nothing else, both approaches unite in throwing 
into light the limitations of context-free RCTs.28 
 
Finally, it should be emphasised that by moving beyond trials we do not mean abandoning 
them or dismissing them outright. The real villain of the piece is not the trial but the 
traditional hierarchy of evidence. Like those who have worked so hard on one of the trials of 
CCT, we believe wholeheartedly that mental health care needs to be evidence-based.1 For 
us, though, evidence cannot be thought of in such clearly self-evident, unambiguous 
hierarchical terms.41  All evidence has blind spots and prejudices and, as we hope to have 
shown here, these are not just technical in nature. As workers in other areas have 
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emphasised, holding on to this hierarchy will mean research on CCT remains unbalanced, 
impartial and unable to capture what is required for effective real world practice.33  
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